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ABSTRACT
Under the nondelegable duty doctrine, a person or entity who has a
duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others
and who maintains a right of control over workplace safety is subject to
liability for harm caused by the failure of a sub-contractor to provide such
safeguards or precautions. This doctrine is based on the policy that the
party with the greatest power over work conditions is in the best position
to implement safety measures across a complex and layered worksite. This
doctrine has existed in Washington State for decades until the recent
Washington Supreme Court decision Afoa v. Port of Seattle, when the
court was faced with determining whether the duty survived Washington’s
tort reform statutes abrogating joint and several liability. While the court
ultimately concluded that the nondelegable duty doctrine does not survive
Washington’s tort reform statute absent an additional finding of agency,
this Note provides a thorough analysis into the court’s reasoning, compares the reasoning with other jurisdictions faced with similar issues, and
concludes that Afoa v. Port of Seattle was wrongly decided. The nondelegable duty doctrine should have been found to survive Washington’s tort
reform legislation because it is rooted in principles of agency; therefore,
an explicit additional finding of agency by a trier of fact is redundant and
will have lasting consequences on workplace safety in complex worksites.
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INTRODUCTION
In Washington State, multiemployer worksites, such as airports and
construction sites, are vast productions with multiple layers of employees.
As with any complex worksite with multiple moving parts and players,
safety is an obvious concern. But who should face liability for workplace
injuries? For decades in Washington, the party with the right of control
over work conditions was said to have a nondelegable duty1 to provide a
safe workplace.2 This meant that the duty to provide a safe workplace
could not be delegated to any other party, and the duty holder is liable for
any injuries that take place as a result of failing to adhere to proper safety
measures.3 In many cases, this ended up being the property owner or
general contractor. The policy behind this doctrine was that the party with
the greatest power over work conditions was in the best position to
implement safety measures across a complex and layered worksite.
However, in a recent decision by the Washington Supreme Court, Afoa v.
Port of Seattle, the court changed the rule on nondelegable duties by
holding that, absent an additional finding of agency, the nondelegable duty
doctrine is inconsistent with Washington’s tort reform statute abrogating
joint and several liability in most contexts.4
The case that caused this change in law began in 2007, when Brandon
Afoa was severely injured during the course of his employment at Seattle–
Tacoma International Airport (Sea–Tac Airport).5 Afoa instituted a thirdparty recovery action against the Port of Seattle (Port), the owner of the
premises where he was injured, but not against his direct employer.6 The
Port asserted an “empty chair defense,” arguing that the airlines that
contracted with Afoa’s employer shared fault for Afoa’s injuries.7 After
trial, the jury found that the Port retained a right of control over Afoa’s
work conditions, giving rise to a nondelegable duty, and it assessed
liability of 0.2% to the plaintiff, 25% to the Port, and 74.8% split equally
between the four airlines. Both parties appealed.8 At the court of appeals,
1. Some authorities spell this word as “non-delegable.” While some quotations within this article
use this spelling, the author will consistently use the spelling “nondelegable.”
2. See Henning v. Crosby Group, Inc., 802 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1991); Stute v. PB.M.C., Inc., 788
P.2d 545 (Wash. 1990); George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman Plumbing & Heating Inc., 836 P.2d
851 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Doss v. ITT Ravonier Inc., 803 P.2d 4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Gregory J.
Duff, Job Site Safety in Washington: Requiring Actual Control When Imposing Statutory Duties on
Job Site Owners, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 355, 355–57 (1994).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
4. Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa II), 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018).
5. Id. at 906–07.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 908.
8. Id. at 909. It is noteworthy that, had the jury not assessed 0.2% liability to Mr. Afoa, he would
have been able to recover the full verdict against the Port under Revised Code of Washington section
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the court reversed the allocation of liability, concluding that because the
jury had specifically concluded that the Port retained a right of control over
Afoa’s work conditions, it had a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe
workspace, and its fault could not be allocated to the four airlines.9
However, in a subsequent appeal10 to the Washington Supreme
Court, decided in July 2018, the court held that the court of appeals’ ruling
was inconsistent with Revised Code of Washington section
4.22.070(1)(a), which abolished joint and several liability for concurrent
negligence.11 Therefore, the court held that the Port was not vicariously
liable for the fault of the airlines, despite its nondelegable duty status; it
was only required to pay damages for its allocated liability.12 In order to
find the Port vicariously liable, the plaintiff had to establish a principal–
agent relationship in accordance with the statute. Although this is a
question of fact for the jury to decide, the plaintiff failed to make any
agency arguments until after the verdict, waiving his opportunity to raise
this issue on appeal.13 A strong dissent pointed out a major problem with
this ruling—that a nondelegable duty would now essentially be delegable,
thus defeating the purpose of a nondelegable duty designation and erasing
decades of precedent of protecting injured workers in this context.14
The crux of the Afoa litigation is whether the traditional
nondelegable duty doctrine was eliminated through Washington State’s
tort reform measures. Specifically, whether the enactment of Revised
Code of Washington section 4.22.070 eliminated or changed the
nondelegable duty doctrine. This Note tackles this inquiry in four parts.
Part I discusses the litigation history of the Afoa cases and the competing
majority and dissenting opinions. Part II reviews the history of
Washington State tort reform and the nondelegable duty doctrine. Part III
provides a comparative analysis of other jurisdictions and how they have
addressed similar conflicts between nondelegable duties and tort reform
statutes. Part IV concludes the article with the opinion that the
nondelegable duty doctrine is compatible with Washington’s tort reform
statute because, just as vicarious liability arises from agency relationships,
the nondelegable duty doctrine similarly arises from agency relationships.
4.22.070(1)(b), which allows for joint and several liability when the Plaintiff has no fault. Therefore,
because he was assessed 0.2% liability, he ultimately lost 74.8% of his verdict. Respondent Brandon
Afoa’s Motion for Reconsideration at 25, Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903 (2018) (No. 94525-0). For more
information on joint and several liability, see REV. CODE WASH. § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993).
9. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 909.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 910.
12. Id. at 915.
13. Id. at 911.
14. Id. at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, the ultimate result of Afoa II is a complete change of the
nondelegable duty doctrine, and it creates additional, unnecessary
obstacles for injured workers to obtain justice and relief that are contrary
to public policy.
I. LITIGATION HISTORY OF AFOA
In 2007, Brandon Afoa was injured during the course of his
employment while working at Sea–Tac Airport.15 Afoa’s employer was
Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics Enterprises Inc. (EAGLE), which
contracts with airlines to provide ground services, such as loading and
unloading.16 Afoa was driving a “pushback” vehicle on an airline ramp
toward gate S-16 when he lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a
large piece of loading equipment that then fell on him.17 The loss of control
of the vehicle was allegedly due to a mechanical failure, and the collision
rendered Afoa paralyzed.18 He obtained some recovery through
Washington’s Workers’ Compensation system, and he also brought a
third-party action to obtain relief from the wrongful parties.19
A. Afoa I
In 2009, Afoa sued the Port, which owns and operates Sea–Tac
Airport, on the basis that it failed to maintain a safe premises, it violated
common law, and it breached statutory duties to maintain a safe
workplace.20 Afoa sought recovery based on three theories: (1) as a
business invitee; (2) for breach of safety regulations under the Washington
Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), chapter 49.17 of the
Revised Code of Washington; and (3) the duty of a general contractor to
maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors.21
Afoa alleged that the Port controlled the manner in which he
performed his work at Sea–Tac Airport; therefore, it should be liable
despite the fact that the Port was not his direct employer.22 In support of
this theory, Afoa claimed the following:

15. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 393 P.3d 802, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
16. Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa I), 296 P.3d 800, 804 (Wash. 2013).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Washington’s legislature provides for third-party actions if a third party is liable. REV. CODE.
WASH. § 51.24.030(1) (1995). “The Legislature evidences a strong policy in favor of actions against
third parties by assigning the cause of action to the Department of Labor and Industries if the workman
elects not to bring a third party suit.” Evans v. Thompson, 879 P.2d 938, 939 (Wash. 1994).
20. Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804.
21. Id. at 803.
22. Id. at 804.
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First, he claims the Port retains control over the “Airfield Area”
(where the accident allegedly took place) in its lease agreement with
the airlines, which grants the airlines use of the Airfield Area “subject
at all times to the exclusive control and management by the
Port.” . . . . Second, Afoa claims the Port retains control through its
license agreement with EAGLE, which requires EAGLE to abide by
all Port rules and regulations and allows the Port to inspect EAGLE’s
work. The agreement also disclaims liability for accidents and
equipment malfunctions. Finally, Afoa claims the Port retains control
over EAGLE by the Port’s conduct. He specifically claims that the
Port continuously controls and supervises the actions of EAGLE and
its employees and that the Port previously asserted control over
tug/pushback brake maintenance following an incident that was
similar to, and three months before, Afoa’s accident.23

In 2013, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary
judgment for the Port.24 The court held that there were genuine issues of
material fact as to preclude a grant of summary judgment, and the case
could proceed. Specifically, it held that Afoa’s premises liability claim
was potentially viable because Afoa was a business invitee.25 The court
also held that Afoa may have a potentially viable WISHA claim because
jobsite owners have a statutory duty to prevent WISHA violations if they
retain control over work done on a jobsite.26 Such a duty does not depend
on the existence of a direct employment agreement.27 Furthermore, the
court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
Port retained sufficient control over EAGLE and Afoa that it acquired the
duty to prevent WISHA violations.28 Finally, the court held that the Port
may have had a duty to maintain safe common work areas under the
common law safe workplace doctrine, which states that landowners and
general contractors that retain control over a work site have a duty to
maintain safe common work areas.29 The case was remanded to superior
court for further proceedings where it progressed to trial and subsequent
appeals, entitled Afoa II.

23. Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. Id. at 803.
25. Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804–05.
26. Id. at 806.
27. Id. at 807.
28. Id. at 808.
29. The common law safe workplace doctrine will be referred to in this Note as the nondelegable
duty doctrine. See id. at 808 (citing Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 582 P.2d 500, 505–06
(Wash. 1978); Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472, 475–76 (Wash. 2002)).
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B. Afoa II
At trial, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Afoa and assessed his
damages at $40 million.30 The jury found that the Port retained control
over EAGLE’s work, which gave rise to a nondelegable duty.31 However,
the Port asserted an empty chair defense, which allowed the jury to allocate
damages to the non-party airlines that used EAGLE’s services under
comparative negligence standards.32 The jury allocated 25% fault to the
Port and 18.7% fault to each of the airlines, resulting in a judgment against
the Port for only $10 million of the $40 million assessed damages. Both
parties appealed.33
The Port’s appeal focused on the phrasing of question 1 in the special
verdict form, which asked the jury whether the Port retained a right to
control the manner in which EAGLE “performed its work or maintained
its equipment used to provide ground work support.”34 Afoa’s appeal
argued that the jury should have been precluded from allocating fault to
the four airlines because the Port had a nondelegable duty to maintain a
safe workplace.35 The court of appeals held that the special verdict
question 1 was not erroneous because both the common law theory of
retained control and the WISHA “specific” duty standard depend on
control over the manner of work done on a worksite.36 The court of appeals
also concluded that the Port had a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe
workplace, including safe equipment, and as such, it was vicariously liable
for any breach of that duty.37 The Supreme Court of Washington granted
review of the case to address the issue of allocation of fault to the nonparty
airlines and Afoa’s contingent issues concerning the Port’s assertion of an
empty chair defense.38
In its review of the case, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned
that the Tort Reform Act of 1986 abrogated the common law rule of joint
and several liability, and that Revised Code of Washington section
4.22.070 requires all liability to be apportioned unless a listed exception
30. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 393 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
31. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 916 (Wash. 2018) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Special Verdict Form at
1, Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 09-2-06657-4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 31, 2015), 2015 WL 1911587.
32. In 2010, Afoa filed a separate suit against the four airlines that used EAGLE’s ground
services. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and then dismissed after the court denied Afoa’s
motion to add the Port of Seattle. The federal court concluded that Afoa failed to show the airlines
were at fault and granted the airlines summary judgment in February and June 2014. Afoa, 393 P.3d
at 806.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Special Verdict Form, supra note 31, at 1.
35. Afoa, 393 P.3d at 808.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018).
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applies.39 Common law vicarious liability is one of the statute’s
exceptions, but the court stated that it would only apply if the jury made
the necessary finding of control, which did not happen in this case.40
The court reasoned that while principles of common law survive
Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070, there is no clearly
established common law right to hold tortfeasors with a nondelegable duty
vicariously liable for another entity’s breach of the same duty.41 The court
admitted that no delegation occurred here. In addition, simply because the
Port cannot delegate its responsibility does not mean it must adopt the
responsibility of another.42 There is a common law duty to provide a safe
workplace in Washington, which is why the Port was directly liable in this
case; however, the Port could only be vicariously liable for the airlines’
breach of their nondelegable duties if a jury found that the Port retained
control over the airlines.43 The jury was not presented with this specific
question.44 The jury only found that the Port retained control over
EAGLE.45
For these reasons, the court concluded that a nondelegable duty does
not supersede fault allocation under Revised Code of Washington section
4.22.070, and the jury did not find facts that would justify applying the
statute’s agency exception.46 A party is only responsible for the fault of
another person where both were acting in concert or when a person was
acting as an agent or servant of the other party.47 Because the jury did not
directly answer the question of agency, no exception applied. The
Washington Supreme Court, in a 5–4 ruling, reversed the court of appeals’
decision and reinstated the trial court’s apportioned award.48
At this point, the majority’s reasoning seems relatively sound: the
Port cannot be responsible for another entity’s concurrent liability unless
the Port retained control over the other entities, such that the airlines were
acting as agents or servants of the Port. Because the jury did not directly
address the amount of control the Port had over the airlines, there was no
finding that the airlines were agents or servants of the Port. Therefore, the
Port’s “nondelegable duty” is limited to its apportioned liability. This is

39. Id. at 908.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 915.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

328

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:321

consistent with the policy reasons supporting the Tort Reform Act and the
goal of assessing liability based on a party’s apportioned negligence.49
However, while trying to understand the majority’s reasoning, the
purpose of the application of the nondelegable duty designation remains
unclear. If the Port has a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe workplace,
which the trial court essentially found, the majority’s reasoning renders
that designation obsolete because the Port’s nondelegable duty as a jobsite
owner at a multiemployer site is apportioned—or delegated—to the
airlines. In Justice Debra Stephens’s dissenting opinion, she astutely
points out that “[t]he majority’s contrary holding renders the nondelegable
duty doctrine meaningless.”50 While the implications of this holding are
not yet known, it is clear that some change or modification of the rule took
place, whether intentional or not. The result is either an elimination of the
nondelegable duty doctrine altogether or a revision of the doctrine’s
elements.
C. Afoa II Dissent
The dissent struggled to grapple with the majority’s reasoning. In a
perplexed opinion, the dissent pointed out that “the majority’s recognition
that [Revised Code of Washington section] 4.22.070(1)(a) preserves joint
and several liability when a defendant owes a nondelegable duty should
end the matter.”51 If the Port is not held vicariously liable for the safety
breaches that caused Afoa’s injuries, then the Port’s duty is no longer
nondelegable; it becomes something else.52
Under the common law safe workplace doctrine, if the employer
retains control over some part of the independent contractor’s work, the
employer owes a nondelegable duty within the scope of that control to
provide a reasonably safe workplace.53 The origin of the common law safe
workplace doctrine is rooted in “master–servant” agency principles, but
over time, the courts have expanded the doctrine beyond simply a masterservant relationship.54 In another Washington Supreme Court case,55 the
court held that the existence of a safe workplace duty depends on retained
control over work, not on labels or contractual designations such as
49. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 75 P.3d 497, 506 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers,
J., dissenting) (citing Godfrey v. State, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975)).
50. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 916 (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. 1990); Kennedy v. Sealand Serv., Inc., 816 P.2d 75, 81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
54. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
55. Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472 (Wash. 2002).
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independent contractor or general contractor.56 Indeed, the court held that
when an entity retains control over the manner in which work is done on
a worksite, that entity has a duty to keep common work areas safe because
it is in the best position to prevent harm to workers.57 For example,
“[w]here a licensor undertakes to control worker safety in a large, complex
work site like Sea–Tac Airport and is in the best position to control safety,
there is a duty to maintain safe common work areas within the scope of
retained control.”58 These principles, as held in Afoa I and consistently
throughout Washington jurisprudence, support the conclusion that the Port
owed a nondelegable duty to maintain safe common work areas.
The dissent further concluded that the Port owed a statutory
nondelegable duty to ensure WISHA compliance. In Afoa I, the court
confirmed that jobsite owners have a duty to comply with WISHA only if
they retain control over the manner in which contractors complete their
work, and if a jobsite owner retains control over the manner and
instrumentalities of work being done on the jobsites, the owner has a
nondelegable duty to all workers on the jobsite to comply with WISHA
regulations.59 The Afoa I court held that if the jury determined the Port
retained a right to control the manner in which Afoa’s employer performed
its work or maintained safe conditions, the Port owed a nondelegable
specific duty under WISHA.60
Liability under the WISHA specific nondelegable duty doctrine
results in vicarious liability because a control party, such as the Port, bears
the primary responsibility for compliance with safety regulations. 61
Similarly, on construction sites, the general contractor’s supervisory
authority places it in the best position to ensure WISHA compliance for
the safety of all workers; therefore, the general contractor is considered
the primary employer and has, as a matter of policy, the duty to comply
with or ensure compliance with WISHA.62 According to Justice Stephens,
Afoa met his burden to establish the Port’s common law and statutory
nondelegable duty by proving to the jury that the Port retained a right of
control over worksite safety conditions, including safe maintenance of the
vehicle he was driving when he was injured.63

56. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d 800, 817 (Wash.
2013)).
57. Id. (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d at 804).
58. Id. at 918.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 916 (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 551 (Wash. 1990)).
62. Id. at 919.
63. Id. at 915.
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The jury’s verdict found that the Port retained the right to control the
manner in which Afoa’s employer, EAGLE, performed its work and
maintained its equipment. The jury also found that the combined
negligence of the Port, the nonparty airlines, and Afoa proximately caused
Afoa’s injuries.64 The jury answered “yes” to question 1 on the specific
verdict form which asked the jury whether the Port retained a right to
control the manner in which Afoa’s employer, EAGLE, performed its
work or maintained its equipment used to provide ground support work
for the non-party air carriers.65 Therefore, Justice Stephens argues, the
verdict is dispositive of three things: “(1) the Port retained a right of
control to ensure compliance with safety standards in the workplace, (2)
the Port therefore owed a nondelegable common law and WISHA specific
duty to Afoa, and, as a result, (3) the Port is directly and vicariously liable
for Afoa’s injuries.”66 The dissent concluded as follows:
[T]he Port’s control over the work site is sufficiently analogous to
that of a general contractor to support the nondelegable duty theory
of vicarious liability. As a result, the Port, no less than a general
contractor, is not only directly liable for its own negligence but also
vicariously liable for safety breaches of others.67

In rejecting the majority’s theory of multiple nondelegable duties, the
dissent points out that there is no jury finding that the airlines retained
control over Afoa’s work conditions, only a finding that the Port retained
control.68 The fact that there may be concurrent duties at a multiemployer
worksite is unremarkable because the Port’s workplace safety duty is seen
as prime or primary.69 Only the Port, not the airlines, is analogous to a
general contractor because “[t]he Port operates a major airport facility, is
responsible for its own employees, and allows controlled access to
thousands of employees of other employers.”70 The Port owed a common
law and statutory specific duty to maintain workplace safety without
regard to whether others at the worksite, including the airlines, also owed
a duty.71
The dissent next addressed the majority’s argument that Revised
Code of Washington section 4.22.070 abrogated vicarious liability in this
situation. Even after the enactment of the statute, joint and several liability
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 920.
67. Id. at 921.
68. Id. at 922.
69. Id. (citing Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 912 P.2d 472, 479 (Wash.
1996)).
70. Id. at 919 (citing Afoa I, 296 P.3d 800, 814 (Wash. 2013)).
71. Id.
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remains appropriate in certain situations. As stated within the statute, “[a]
party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for payment of
the proportionate share of another party where both were acting in concert
or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.”72
Therefore, this case becomes an issue of statutory interpretation and
whether the phrase “acting as an agent or servant” encompasses the
historical development of agency law beyond the initial master–servant
context to include the nondelegable duty.73 The majority rejected the
Port’s argument that the statute should be read to preserve joint and several
liability only in master–servant or principal–agent relationships; however,
it held that, in order to invoke joint and several liability premised on the
nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, there must be proof of a
direct agency relationship.74 The dissent rejected this interpretation
because vicarious liability under the nondelegable duty doctrine arises
from the same principles as vicarious liability in traditional agency
relationships.75 Therefore, the nondelegable duty doctrine—as a form of
vicarious liability recognized in agency law—is encompassed within the
traditional joint and several liability retained in Revised Code of
Washington section 4.22.070(1)(a).76
The dissent concluded with a warning of the devastating effects of
the majority’s holding: its interpretation of Revised Code of Washington
section 4.22.070(1)(a) essentially destroys the workplace safety doctrine
and will result in general contractors and jobsite owners passing off
liability to subcontractors and others who commit safety breaches; this is
a step backward from Washington’s recognition that the nondelegable
duty doctrine is intended to “place the safety burden on the entity in the
best position to ensure a safe working environment.”77
II. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON STATE TORT REFORM AND
NONDELEGABLE DUTIES
This section provides a brief historical overview of Washington State
law as it pertains to the issues addressed in the Afoa litigation, as well as

72. Id. at 915 (majority opinion) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1993)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 923 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15, topic
2, intro. note at 394 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (nondelegability rules, which arise out of some relation
toward the public or the particular plaintiff, “are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable
for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective of whether the employer has himself
been at fault”)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 924.
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the compatibility of Washington’s Tort Reform Act with the nondelegable
duty doctrine.
A. Washington State’s Tort Reform Act
In the 1980s, a sweep of tort reform took place across the United
States, fueled primarily by a crisis in the cost and availability of liability
insurance.78 Public polls showed that very few Americans supported the
underlying premise of joint and several liability, and many state
legislatures passed legislation in response.79 Many Americans considered
tort reform essential to reduce the debilitating financial consequences to a
single, and perhaps undeserving, defendant when other defendants are
unable to afford a judgment. In the 1980s, multiple states adopted tort
reform legislation introducing comparative negligence standards and
abrogating joint and several liability.80 In 1986, Washington State’s
legislature passed the Tort Reform Act with the same objectives.
The preamble to Washington’s Tort Reform Act states that its
purpose, in part, is to “enact further reforms in order to create a more
equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the
availability and affordability of insurance.”81 In essence, the goal of
Washington’s Tort Reform statute was to create a comparative negligence
system with the purpose of providing greater fairness to defendants and
providing a “more complete, workable and effective remedy” for the
injured plaintiff.82 The Washington Supreme Court described the catalyst
for the statute’s enactment, noting that “[t]he legislature specifically noted
78. Marco de Sae Silva, Constitutional Challenges to Washington’s Limit on Noneconomic
Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653, 655–56 (1988).
A[n] . . . insurance crisis arose in the mid-1980’s. During that period, the cost of liability
insurance increased not only for health care providers but also for day care centers,
architects, commercial fishermen, and other businesses and professions. Many businesses
and local governments found liability insurance difficult to obtain. In Washington State, a
legislative committee formed to study the crisis found that it had been caused by a
combination of poor management practices in the insurance industry and rising litigation
costs and awards.
Washington was one of a number of states to respond to the crisis by enacting tort
reform legislation . . . .
Id.; see also Stewart A. Estes, The Short Happy Life of Litigation Between Tortfeasors: Contribution,
Indemnification and Subrogation After Washington’s Tort Reform Acts, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69,
75 (1997); Kathryn T. Hicks, The Case for Reform: An Economic Analysis of Joint and Several
Liability After Comparative Negligence, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 187, 197–98 (1988).
79. Estes, supra note 78, at 75–76; Hicks, supra note 78, at 197.
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.211.5 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5(b) (repealed 1998);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (repealed 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(2) (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (West 1953) (renumbered as § 78B-5-808); 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 30.
81. 1986 Wash. Sess. Laws 1354.
82. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 75 P.3d 497, 506 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers,
J., dissenting) (citing Godfrey v. State, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975)).
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the escalating costs to governmental entities through increased exposure
to lawsuits, awards, and increased costs of insurance coverage, as well as
increases in costs in professional liability insurance for physicians and
other health care providers, and other professionals.”83 The Act furthered
the reforms, which had begun with the adoption of
comparative negligence in 1973, by abolishing joint and several liability
in most situations.84
Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070 of the Tort Reform
Act of 1986 is “the centerpiece of the 1986 amendatory package.”85 The
pertinent portion of this legislation reads, “In all actions involving fault of
more than one entity,86 the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of
the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the
claimant’s damages . . . ,” the sum of which shall total 100%.87 This
provision codified a comparative negligence standard and abolished joint
and several liability as to multiple defendants, except under certain
circumstances.88 Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that “the legislature left no doubt as to its intent—proportionate
liability ‘has now become the rule.’”89
The legislative text of Revised Code of Washington section
4.22.070(1)(a) includes three exceptions to the abolition of joint and
several liability: (1) where the negligent parties were acting in concert or
where there was a master–servant or principal–agent relationship; (2) in
cases involving hazardous waste, tortious interference with business, and
unmarked fungible goods such as asbestos; and (3) where the plaintiff is
fault-free and judgment has been entered against two or more defendants.90
The first exception is the focus of this Note because the nondelegable duty
doctrine is a form of vicarious liability, and they are both forms of an
83. Tegman, 75 P.3d at 499.
84. Id. (citing Kottler v. State, 963 P.2d 834, 838 (Wash. 1998)).
85. Id.
86. For more information on the term entity, see Cornelius J. Peck, Washington’s Partial
Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV.
233, 243 (1987) (“Despite the importance of what is an ‘entity’ in this section of the 1986 Tort Reform
Act, the statute does not contain a definition of ‘entity.’ It is apparent from the words used that the
term means more than defendant and also more than potential defendants with a defense to liability to
the plaintiff. It will include employers with an immunity from suit by injured employees, parents with
a defense to a suit by children, spouses, and unidentified persons, bodies, and association. Apparently,
although the lack of a definition makes it less than certain, an ‘entity’ must be a juridicial being capable
of fault, and does not include inanimate objects or forces of nature.”).
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018) (citing Kottler v. State, 963 P.2d 834, 838 (Wash.
1998)).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(a)–(c) (1993);
Kottler, 963 P.2d at 839.
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agency relationship. Therefore, the nondelegable duty doctrine is
encompassed within the first exception, and it is the means to which Afoa
could have obtained joint and several relief from the Port.
B. Principles of Agency
Because of the significance of the principal–agent relationship or
master–servant relationship,91 Revised Code of Washington section
4.22.070(1)(a) allows for joint and several liability by holding the
principal responsible for the fault of the agent and the master responsible
for the fault of the servant.92 An agent can be defined as “a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another under an express or
implied agreement, and who . . . is subject to the other’s control or right of
control.”93 “In contrast, an independent contractor may be defined as one
who contractually undertakes to perform services for another, but who is
neither controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control.”94
Whether an agency relationship exists is determined by the trier of
fact. If the inference is clear that there is or is not a master–servant
relationship, the court decides the issue; otherwise, the jury determines the
question after instruction by the court as to the matters of fact to be
considered.95
The trier of fact considers multiple factors when assessing whether a
party is an agent or an independent contractor, including:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;

91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
The word servant has retained its early significance in cases involving the liability of the
master to third persons and the common law liability of master and servant. However, in
statutes dealing with various aspects of the relation between the two parties, the word
“employee” has largely displaced “servant.” In general, this word is synonymous with
servant. Under the usual Employers’ Liability Acts and the Workmen’s Compensation Acts
the tests given in this Section for the existence of the relation of master and servant are
valid. Beyond this there is little uniformity of decision. Under the existing regulations and
decisions involving the Federal Labor Relations Act, there is little, if any, distinction
between employee and servant as here used.
Id.
92. Gregory C. Sick, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several Liability:
Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 109 (1992).
93. Chapman v. Black, 741 P.2d 998, 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
94. Id.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
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(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.96

The factors are of varying importance and all factors need not be
present. However, all factors relate directly or indirectly to “the crucial
factor of control or right of control resident in the employer or principal.”97
The test of control is not about whether the principal actually interferes
with the work of the agent, but whether the principal holds the right to
exercise such control over the agent.98 As discussed below, the
nondelegable duty doctrine creates a form of agency relationship.99
Because in Afoa the trier of fact—the jury—found that the Port retained a
right of control over Afoa’s work conditions, a nondelegable duty and an
agency relationship were created.
C. The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine
The history of the nondelegable duty doctrine reflects a policy-based
expansion of the traditional vicarious liability principles recognized in the
“master–servant” relationship in agency law.100 As a general rule in
Washington State, a principal is not liable for injuries caused by an
independent contractor whose services the principal engages.101 However,
there is an exception at common law which subjects the principal to
liability for its contractor’s tortious conduct even if the principal exercised

96. Id.; Chapman, 741 P.2d at 1001.
97. O.E. Hollingbery v. Dunn, 411 P.2d 431, 435–436 (Wash. 1966).
98. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co., 582 P.2d 500, 505 (Wash. 1978).
99. See infra Section II(C).
100. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 915 (Wash. 2018) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
101. Stout v. Warren, 290 P.3d 972, 976 (Wash. 2012).
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reasonable care.102 This exception gives rise to vicarious liability and is
nondelegable.103 The Restatement explains this doctrine as follows:
The [rules] . . . do not rest upon any personal negligence of the
employer. They are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer
liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective
of whether the employer has himself been at fault. They arise in
situations in which, for reasons of policy, the employer is not
permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work
to the contractor. The liability imposed is closely analogous to that of
a master for the negligence of his servant.104

The statement commonly made in such cases is that the employer is
under a duty that he is not free to delegate to the contractor. Such a “nondelegable duty” requires the person upon whom it is imposed to answer
for it that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent
contractor, to whom the performance of the duty is entrusted.105
A nondelegable duty can be created by statute or administrative
regulation.106 Specifically, a party who, under a statute or administrative
regulation, has a duty to provide “specified safeguards or precautions for
the safety of others is subject to liability of the others for whose protection
the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor
employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”107 In such
cases, the employer cannot delegate his duty to provide such safeguards or
precautions to an independent contractor.108
D. Washington’s Regulations Giving Rise to a Nondelegable Duty
In Washington, a general contractor, as well as an owner-developer,
has a nondelegable duty to enforce applicable state and federal safety
regulations where the contractor or owner exercises authority over the
safety of the workplace.109 In 1973, the Washington State Legislature
passed the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA).110 The
purpose of this Act was to “create, maintain, continue, and enhance the
industrial safety and health program of the state” and “to assure, insofar as
may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful working conditions for
102. Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc., 313 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416–29 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
105. Millican, 313 P.3d at 1220.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 424 cmt. a.
109. 16 DAVID K. DEWOLD & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, TORT LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4:15 (4th ed. 2018).
110. Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA), 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 212.
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every man and woman working in the state of Washington . . . .”111 The
Act was explicitly created in the public interest and for the welfare of
Washington citizens.112 The pertinent section of WISHA reads as follows:
Each employer:
(1) Shall furnish to each of his or her employees a place of
employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely
to cause serious injury or death to his or her employees: PROVIDED,
That no citation or order assessing a penalty shall be issued to any
employer solely under the authority of this subsection except where
no applicable rule or regulation has been adopted by the department
covering the unsafe or unhealthful condition of employment at the
workplace; and
(2) Shall comply with the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated
under this chapter.113

There is a clear public policy against allowing general contractors to
delegate or otherwise avoid their responsibility to maintain a safe jobsite
for all workers. In the construction site scenario, the general contractor is
believed to bear the primary responsibility for compliance with safety
regulations because the general contractor’s innate supervisory authority
constitutes sufficient control over the workplace.114 While courts have
allowed for general contractors or worksite owners to contract away this
nondelegable status with an indemnification addendum,115 absent such
indemnification agreement, liability flows to those who are in a position
to control the actual implementation of safety standards in the
workplace.116 The statute created a nondelegable duty on the part of a
general contractor to provide a safe place of work for employees of
subcontractors on the jobsite; this duty extended to providing reasonable
safety equipment where necessary.117

111. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1973).
112. Id.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060 (2010).
114. Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 878 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994) (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 550 (Wash. 1990)), rev’d en banc, 912 P.2d 472
(Wash. 1996).
115. Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 912 P.2d 472, 482 (Wash. 1996) (“This
court has historically deferred to such contractual relationships in lieu of adopting new tort principles
in this field. The allocation of responsibility for workplace injuries by contract is consistent with this
historical policy and was expressly approved by the Legislature . . . . The 1986 Tort Reform Act does
not compel another conclusion.”).
116. Cano-Garcia v. King Cty., 277 P.3d 34, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
117. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co., 582 P.2d 500, 506 (Wash. 1978) (this case analyzed
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.16.030, which has since been repealed and replaced with WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.17.060).
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Furthermore, under Washington’s regulations, each employer is
required to furnish to each of their employees “a place of employment free
from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause serious injury
or death to their employees.”118 In addition, every employer shall “require
safety devices, furnish safeguards for employees, and adopt and use
practices, methods, operations, and processes that are reasonably adequate
to render such employment and place of employment safe.”119 Every
employer shall “do everything reasonably necessary to protect the life and
safety of employees.”120
Under Washington’s statutes and regulations, principals have a
nondelegable duty to provide workplace safety when they exert a right of
control over an agent. In the Afoa case, the jury found that the Port, not the
airlines, retained a right of control over Afoa’s work conditions;121
therefore, the Port retained a right to control the manner in which Afoa’s
employer, EAGLE, performed its work or maintained the equipment used
to provide ground support work for the non-party air carriers.122 This
established an agency relationship and a duty that is applicable to the
nondelegable duty doctrine.
An agency relationship is formed, and vicarious liability is imposed,
when a principal exerts a right of control over its agent; this is one of the
exceptions to Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070’s abolition of
joint and several liability. The nondelegable duty doctrine, as a form of
agency, should similarly apply as an exception to the statute. Because the
nondelegable duty doctrine is rooted in a vicarious liability and agency
analysis, a finding of an agency relationship triggers joint and several
liability to the principal. Since the Port has a nondelegable duty to provide
a safe worksite pursuant to Washington’s statutes and regulations and
common law, it is subject to joint and several liability as an agency
exception to Revised Code of Washington section 4.22.070. It should not
be permitted to delegate its liability.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO
NONDELEGABLE DUTIES AND THEIR RESILIENCE IN LIGHT OF TORT
REFORM
Other jurisdictions have faced a similar dilemma in determining
whether their respective tort reform measures affected the longstanding

118. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-040 (2016).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 909 (Wash. 2018).
122. Id. at 915, 922 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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nondelegable duty doctrine and have reached different results.123 While
none of these cases are entirely analogous to Afoa II, they provide helpful
insight on how courts in other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues
relating to nondelegable duties and tort reform legislation that abrogated
joint and several liability in certain instances. They also demonstrate how
other jurisdictions determine if the nondelegable duty doctrine can be
salvaged with a finding of multiple, concurrent nondelegable duties.
A. Arizona
In 2000, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on a strikingly similar
issue yet rendered the opposite ruling than Afoa II. In a wrongful death
action against the city of Phoenix, the city conceded that it had a
nondelegable duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition
but argued that the legislative abolition of joint and several liability
changed the rule on nondelegable duties.124 The city named Arizona Public
Service (APS), an independent contractor, as a non-party at fault because
APS was obligated to operate and maintain streetlights pursuant to a
contract between APS and the city.125 There was conflicting evidence on
whether the streetlight was on at the time of the accident, which would
possibly result in some fault on the part of the independent contractor
when the plaintiff was hit and killed by an automobile while crossing a
street.126
Similar to Washington’s statute, the Arizona statute at issue limited
joint and several liability to situations where persons are acting in concert
or where the other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.127
Because there was no finding that APS was a servant or an agent of the
city, the city claimed it could not be vicariously liable for the acts of
APS.128

123. See generally Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625 (Ariz. 2000); SeaBright Ins. Co. v.
US Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2011); Srithong v. Total Inv. Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994); Archambault v. Soneco/Ne., Inc., 946 A.2d 839 (Conn. 2008); Gazo v. City of Stamford,
765 A.2d 505 (Conn. 2001).
124. Wiggs, 10 P.3d at 627–28.
125. Id. at 626.
126. Id.
127. Id.
The liability of each defendant is several only and is not joint, except that a party is
responsible for the fault of another person, or for payment of the proportionate share of
another person, if any of the following applies: 1. Both the party and the other person were
acting in concert. 2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party. 3. The
party’s liability for the fault of another person arises out of a duty created by the federal
employers’ liability act, 45 United States Code section 51.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(D) (2001).
128. Wiggs, 10 P.3d at 628.
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In its analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court noted the policy behind
the nondelegable duty doctrine is “premised on the principle that certain
duties of the employer are of such importance that he may not escape
liability merely by delegating performance to another.”129
Although there was no explicit finding that the independent
contractor was a servant or an agent of the city, the court rejected that this
finding was necessary to find an agency relationship.130 In response to the
city’s argument, the court astutely noted, “[H]ow can it be that one can
admit to the existence of a non-delegable duty, but then disclaim liability
for the non-performance of that duty? The concepts are mutually
exclusive.”131
Second, the court noted numerous examples of when an independent
contractor is considered an agent. Because APS contracted to act on the
city’s behalf to maintain the streetlights, APS was the city’s agent for the
performance of that nondelegable duty.132 Where there is a nondelegable
duty, principals are held liable for the negligence of agents whether the
agents were an employees or independent contractors.133
The court ultimately held that when an employer has a nondelegable
duty, the vicarious liability of that employer is unaffected by Arizona’s
comparative negligence statute because the one with whom the principal
contracts to perform that duty is, as a matter of law, always an agent for
purposes of applying the doctrine of vicarious liability.134
Following the Arizona Supreme Court’s analysis, because APS was
the city’s agent for the performance of the nondelegable duty to maintain
the streetlights, the airlines are similarly the Port of Seattle’s agent for the
performance of the nondelegable duty to enforce applicable state and
federal safety regulations.135 Because the jury expressly found that the Port
exercised control over the safety of the workplace, a determination of
agency should be encompassed within that finding. Because the Arizona
court found that the nondelegable duty doctrine survives Arizona’s
comparative negligence statute when there is an inherent agency
relationship found, a similar interpretation should have been used in Afoa.
B. California
In 1994, California’s appellate court squarely addressed the issue of
whether California’s Tort Reform Statute, which abrogated joint and
129. Id. at 627.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968)).
134. Id. at 629.
135. DEWOLD & ALLEN, supra note 109.
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several liability, applies where a defendant’s liability is based on a
nondelegable duty.136 In Srithong, the plaintiff filed a personal injury
complaint against Total Investment Company (Total), the owner and
manager of a mini-mall, and Modern Roofing Company (Modern), a
subcontractor of Total, who was hired to repair leaks on the roof of the
building.137 When the Modern employees were mopping tar on the roof,
some substance seeped through the building and fell on the plaintiff,
causing burns and scarring.138 The trial court found Modern to be 95% at
fault and Total to be 5% at fault. Total moved to reduce its responsible
share of noneconomic damages to 5% under the California’s Tort Reform
Statute, commonly known as Proposition 51, and the court granted the
motion.139 The plaintiff appealed.
Proposition 51 stated in pertinent part:
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful
death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each
defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall
not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of
non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a separate
judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.140

While a person who hires an independent contractor is generally not
liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor’s negligence in
performing the work, the nondelegable duty doctrine is an exception.141
Under this doctrine, a landlord cannot escape liability for failure to
maintain property in a safe condition by delegating such duty to an
independent contractor.142 In support, the court explained:
[T]he duty which a possessor of land owes to others to put and
maintain it in reasonably safe condition is nondelegable. If an
independent contractor, no matter how carefully selected, is
employed to perform it, the possessor is answerable for harm caused
by the negligent failure of his contractor to put or maintain the
buildings and structures in reasonably safe condition.143

In Srithong, the court found the nondelegable duty rule advances the
same purposes as other forms of vicarious liability: to insure that there will
136. Srithong v. Total Inv. Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 674.
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 1986); id. at 676.
141. Srithong, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Brown v. George Pepperdine Found., 143 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1943)).
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be a financially responsible defendant available to compensate for the
negligent harms caused by that defendant’s activity and to assure that
when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be
compensated by the person whose activity caused the harm.144
The court found a distinction between joint and several liability and
vicarious liability, reasoning that the California statute addresses the
doctrine of joint and several liability, not vicarious tort liability, which is
not based on principles of comparative fault. The court noted, “Unlike the
doctrine of joint and several liability, vicarious liability is a matter of status
or relationship, not fault. Thus, where vicarious liability is involved, there
is no fault to apportion.”145 The nondelegable duty doctrine is a form of
vicarious liability, so the California statute is inapplicable.146 The court
held that because the statute did not abrogate vicarious tort liability,
Proposition 51 did not apply, and Total was fully liable for Modern’s
negligence.147
However, in another case in 2011, the Supreme Court of California
held that duties of care under the California Occupational Safety and
Health Act (Cal-OSHA) are automatically delegated when a party hires an
independent contractor.148 The court focused on the definition of
“employer” that applied to California’s workplace safety laws to support
its conclusion that employees of independent contractors are not
considered to be the hirer’s own employees.149 After 1971, the California
Legislature’s definition of the term “employer” became much more
narrow.150 Because of the scope of who is considered an employee, the
court reasoned that defendant US Airways owed its own employees a duty
to provide a safe workplace, but employees of an independent contractor,
like Aubry, are not considered to be the hirer’s own employees.151
The California Supreme Court concluded that when US Airways
hired the independent contractor, Lloyd W. Aubry Co. (Aubry),152 it
delegated any duty it owed to Aubry’s employees to comply with the
safety requirements of Cal-OSHA.153 Ultimately, the court made the broad
144. Id. at 675 (citing Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968)).
145. Id. at 676 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. at 673.
147. Id. at 676.
148. SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737, 741 (Cal. 2011).
149. Id. at 745; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 6304 (1972).
150. Seabright Ins. Co., 258 P.3d at 740.
151. Id. at 745.
152. By chance, the author found this case during her research, which coincidently included
Lloyd W. Aubry Co.’s employee as a party. Lloyd W. Aubry was the author’s grandfather, and he was
the founder of Lloyd W. Aubry Co.; however, he had since sold his company prior to this case and
was not involved in this litigation.
153. Seabright Ins. Co., 258 P.3d at 745.
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conclusion that the delegation of any duty is implied as an incident of an
independent contractor’s hiring, and it includes a duty to identify the
absence of the safety guards required by Cal-OSHA regulations and to take
reasonable steps to address that hazard.154 Therefore, when US Airways
hired independent contractor Aubry to maintain and repair a conveyor belt,
US Airways presumptively delegated to Aubry any tort law duty of care
under Cal-OSHA.
The concurrence found an issue with the majority’s conclusion,
noting that the majority failed to address the specific question posed on
appeal and instead adopted a rule broader than any party had proposed—
that an employer’s duties under the Cal-OSHA and the regulations issued
under its authority are delegable and, moreover, are presumptively
delegated to independent contractors.155 Essentially, the concurrence—
which reads more like a dissent—took issue with the majority’s analysis.
While the majority stated there was no clear legislative intent on this
issue,156 the concurrence responded with the following argument:
[N]ondelegability is the clear, unavoidable import of section 6400,
subdivision (b), which confirms that Cal–OSHA authorizes the
Division of Occupational Safety & Health (DOSH) to issue citations
to employers at multiemployer worksites when an employee has been
exposed to a hazard . . . “regardless of whether their own employees
were exposed to the hazard.”157

The concurrence also noted that the 1999 amendments to the statutes
addressing multiemployer worksites left no doubt that the legislature
understood and intended that any employer’s Cal-OSHA duties would
extend not only to the employer’s own employees but also those of other
employers.158
In sum, the concurrence was not satisfied with the majority’s analysis
that the legislature intended to treat duties created by Cal-OSHA statutes
and rules as delegable and presumptively delegated whenever an entity
who holds such duty hires an independent contractor.159 Such a rule that
“threatens an erosive effect on workplace safety” should have more solid
grounding in legislative intent than a statutory definition of an
employer.160

154. Id. at 744.
155. Id. at 747 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 739 n.1 (majority opinion).
157. Id. at 747 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 749.
160. Id.
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These California cases demonstrate how some courts have addressed
the nondelegable duty doctrine’s viability in light of tort reform measures.
The Srithong court made a notable point that the nondelegable duty rule
advances the same purposes of other vicarious liability to ensure that a
financially responsible defendant will be available to compensate an
injured party.161 Furthermore, because vicarious liability is a matter of
status or relationship, not fault, it is similar to the nondelegable duty
doctrine, which is based on the relationship between the parties and the
amount of control one party exerts over the other. This conclusion supports
the contention that the nondelegable duty doctrine should not be
eliminated or modified from tort reform statutes abolishing joint and
several liability. The Afoa II court could have reached a similar conclusion
by determining that because the jury found that the Port maintained control
over Afoa’s work conditions, an agency relationship was formed with the
airlines, resulting in a form of vicarious liability.
The Afoa II court does not go as far as Seabright in concluding that
statutory and regulatory duties to provide a safe workplace are
automatically delegated when an independent contractor is hired. Instead,
the court attempts to preserve the nondelegable duty doctrine only when
the agency has been expressly found by the trier of fact. However, the
court’s disposition of the case rendered the same result for Brandon Afoa
as the Seabright court did and essentially changed the rule of nondelegable
duties. Now, plaintiffs are required to prove an additional element of
agency, which, before Afoa II, was inherent in the doctrine itself when a
right of control was maintained over an employee or independent
contractor.
C. Connecticut
Connecticut courts have also addressed similar issues pertaining to
concurrent nondelegable duties, which the Afoa II court found to be
entirely possible. In Gazo, the plaintiff filed suit after suffering bodily
injury when he slipped and fell on an icy and snowy sidewalk in the city
of Stamford, Connecticut.162 In his suit, the plaintiff alleged that Rednick
and Chase Bank owed him a duty to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and
snow and that their failure to do so caused his injuries.163 Chase Bank
proceeded to file an apportionment complaint against Pierni, who was
contracted to perform ice and snow removal services for Chase Bank.164

161. Srithong v. Total Inv. Co., 28 Cal. Reptr. 2d 672, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
162. Gazo v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 507 (Conn. 2001).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 507, 510.
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The court concluded that although Chase Bank had a nondelegable
duty to keep its premises safe, the nondelegable duty doctrine does not
preclude the plaintiff from being able to sue an independent contractor for
its negligence.165 It is not a necessary implication of the nondelegable duty
doctrine that the contractor to whom the performance of the duty has been
assigned may not, under appropriate circumstances, also owe the same
duty to an injured party by their breach.166 This case essentially holds that
concurrent nondelegable duties are possible and consistent with the
historical framework of the doctrine. Even though the performance of the
duty had been delegated to Pierni, it was consistent with the nondelegable
duty doctrine to hold both parties liable.167 The significance of the name
of the doctrine appears to be overlooked by the court in making this point.
Although there was a nondelegable duty, that duty is not exclusive and can
be delegated to others who have comparable liability.168
In Archambault, the court concluded that the proper analysis in
asserting the nondelegable duty doctrine requires a finding of which entity
was truly in control, and it may not always be the general contractor.169
Although the general contractor, Konover, had overall responsibility for
safety on the worksite—or he was the “controlling employer” under
OSHA—that did not mean that he had an nondelegable duty to provide a
safe worksite that precluded the jury from considering its subcontractor’s
negligence.170 In a fact-sensitive analysis, the court noted that the evidence
showed the general contractor did not retain direct work over the
subcontractor’s work, over the subcontractor’s employees, or over the
manner in which the work was to be performed. Further, the general
contractor did not assume direct control over, or interfere with, the
subcontractor’s responsibility to perform their work safely.171 Indeed,
there was an explicit provision in the subcontractor agreement that the
subcontractor “assumed the entire responsibility and liability for all work,
supervision, labor and materials”172 and that it agreed to accept liability for
any loss, damage, or destruction from any cause other than the general
contractor’s sole negligence.173 Because of these facts, the court held that

165. Id. at 511.
166. Id. at 512.
167. Id.
168. Archambault v. Soneco/Ne., Inc., 946 A.2d 839, 860–61 (Conn. 2008).
169. Id. at 861.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 857.
173. Id.
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the general contractor did not have a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe
worksite, and both parties could be comparatively negligent.174
Concurrent nondelegable duties make little sense when looking at the
plain language of the name. While there can conceivably be a difference
between a concurrent duty and delegated duty, the overlap is not distinct
enough because of the relationship between the parties. When a general
contractor, for example, hires an independent contractor, under the Gazo
reasoning, the general contractor has delegated that duty and both parties
now owe concurrent nondelegable duties. This appears to be a similar
analysis that the Afoa II court used, but its clarity is nonetheless lacking
because it ignores the significance that a general contractor owes a primary
duty.
In Archambault, while the court made a proper analysis of
determining which party truly exerted a right of control over workplace
safety, its result is distinguishable from Afoa because there is no indication
of any contract provisions, or indemnification addendums, which would
expressly delegate any such duty. As stated previously, absent such
indemnification agreement, liability should flow to those who are in a
position to control the actual implementation of safety standards in the
workplace.175 The jury in Afoa expressly found that the Port retained
control over EAGLE’s work, which gave rise to a nondelegable duty—
this should end the matter.176
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine is Consistent with Principles of
Agency Within Vicarious Liability and is Compatible with
Washington’s Tort Reform Statute.
The Washington Court of Appeals and the Afoa II dissent provide the
most compelling analysis of the nondelegable duty doctrine and how it is
consistent with vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is rooted in and arises
from the same principles of agency principles; therefore, it is redundant to
require the trier of fact to make an additional finding of agency. The
defining element in the agency relationship is the principal’s right of
control over the agent.177 As such, because the trier of fact found that the
Port of Seattle exercised control over EAGLE, Afoa’s direct employer, its
174. See id.
175. Cano-Garcia v. King Cty., 277 P.3d 34, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
176. Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903, 916 (Wash. 2018) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Special Verdict Form
at 1, Afoa v. Port of Seattle, No. 09-2-06657-4, 2015 WL 1911587 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 31, 2015).
177. Chapman v. Black, 741 P.2d 998, 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see also Gregory C. Sick,
Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Resisting the
Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 110 (1992).
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nondelegable duty status should end the matter. A nondelegable duty, with
an inherent finding of agency, is encompassed within the traditional joint
and several liability situations retained in Revised Code of Washington
section 4.22.070(1)(a).178 Therefore, the Port should have been found joint
and severally liable for Afoa’s injuries. By requiring an additional jury
finding of agency, the court has modified the long-standing nondelegable
duty doctrine.
Furthermore, concurrent nondelegable duties should not absolve the
primary duty-holder from joint and several liability. The fact that there
may be concurrent duties at a multiemployer worksite is unremarkable
because the Port’s workplace safety duty is seen as prime or primary.179
Because the Port is seen as the primary nondelegable duty-holder,
allowing for comparative liability renders a delegation of its duty. If a
nondelegable duty-holder is not entitled to delegate its duty, this
delegation transcends logic. This is the essence of the majority’s
understanding of concurrent liability which reaches absurd results in the
context of the history and policy behind nondelegable duties. In addition,
there was no express finding by the jury that the airlines retained control
over EAGLE, so there is no support for the finding of its concurrent
nondelegable duty. The jury only found that the Port had a nondelegable
duty. However, even if it did make that finding, the Port’s prime
nondelegable duty should require it to be joint and severally liable. As the
dissent in Afoa II pointed out, the Port owed a common law and statutory
specific duty to maintain workplace safety without regard to whether
others at the worksite, including the airlines, also owed a duty.180
B. Policy Implications of the Afoa II Holding
While there are conflicting views on the impact of this litigation, if
the Washington Court of Appeals holding had been upheld, a possible
result would be that airports would be required to be constantly involved
in all aspects of the operations of an airline’s contractors and
subcontractors.181 While this could be viewed of as a negative and tedious
consequence, in reality, this would be a positive, policy-driven outcome
because it would result in the most care and attention to ensure workplace
safety and WISHA compliance.
178. See supra Part II.
179. Afoa II, 421 P.3d at 915 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island
Steel Erectors, Inc., 912 P.2d 472, 470 (Wash. 1996)).
180. Id. at 919.
181. Mark Dombroff, Ten Years Later and $30 Million Less: Seatac is Not Vicariously Liable,
LEXOLOGY (July 20, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54118e90-a74a-4abbae0d-61078949c05d [https://perma.cc/BK99-4G4T].
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The implications for the Afoa II majority’s holding could possibly
result in devastating consequences for workplace safety. The doctrine of
nondelegable duties existed for decades based on the policy reason that the
person or entity in the best position to prevent harm to its business invitees
and workers—even independent contractors—should bear the burden of
compensating for any harm. The policy behind the nondelegable duty
doctrine incentivizes large employers to do everything within their power
to ensure workplace safety.
After Afoa II, a devastating consequence results: employers will no
longer have this incentive. With this new rule in place, employers will not
take their role in preventing workplace safety as seriously because it is
now state law that they will not be jointly and severally liable absent an
additional finding of agency. With no incentives in place backed up by
current law, employers are likely to cut costs on workplace safety where
they are able, distance themselves from subcontractors to avoid any
possible finding of agency, and shift liability to the subcontractors.
This will have a devastating residual effect on workplace safety and
put the brunt of implementing workplace safety policy on those who lack
the resources, power, and effectiveness to protect workers. Smaller
independent contractors are the most likely to cut corners on safety,
resulting in injury and death, and they are the most likely to be insolvent
and fail to maintain liability insurance.182 Another possible outcome of this
case is that large entities, such as the Port of Seattle and other large general
contractors on construction sites, will reduce their safety activities because
the less involved they are in protecting worker safety, the less exposure
they have to a jury’s apportionment of responsibility.183 This possibility
leads to a direct impact on workplace safety conditions. When the general
contractor or jobsite owner is not held ultimately responsible for safety at
its worksites, there is a very real possibility of “chaos ensu[ing]” because
“[e]verybody does their own thing.”184 As noted in Seabright, the Afoa II
majority’s holding “threatens an erosive effect on workplace safety.”185
The Port of Seattle has the greatest resources to fully ensure
workplace safety. It is the largest entity with the greatest ability to finance
workplace safety measures, and it is the most likely to maintain its liability
insurance. Consistent with previous findings of the purpose of the
nondelegable duty doctrine, the Port should bear the primary responsibility
for compliance with safety regulations because the general contractor’s
182. Respondent Brandon Afoa’s Motion for Reconsideration at 15, Afoa II, 421 P.3d 903 (2018)
(No. 94525-0).
183. Id. at 15–16.
184. Id. at 16.
185. SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737, 749 (Cal. 2011).
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innate supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the
workplace.186
C. The Future of Washington State Post-Afoa II
The majority in Afoa II completely changed the rule on nondelegable
duties as it was known among Washington workers and employers. The
majority’s harsh and perhaps inadvertent holding will have devastating
consequences on injured workers, not least of whom was Brandon Afoa
himself. While a simple holding conceivably resulted—that there must be
an explicit finding of an agency relationship in order for there to be joint
and several liability—jobsite owners will likely respond to this conclusion
and change their control over jobsites. While in a perfect world safety is
everyone’s priority, I am concerned that this holding will reduce incentives
to control workplace safety measures, and it will distance jobsite owners
from taking any actions that could result in a separate finding of agency.
With the entity in the greatest position to ensure workplace safety taking
steps backwards, a likely consequence will be increased workplace
injuries. If a general contractor or property owner is able to seamlessly
delegate such duties to subcontractors, less equipped entities will be tasked
with greater responsibility.
For now, the rule appears to be that in litigation with multiemployer
worksites, injured plaintiffs should take care to identify every jobsite
owner and independent contractor at every level and ensure the trier of fact
explicitly finds an agency relationship between the nondelegable duty
holder and any possible lower level contractor or employee involved.
While the true impact of this holding is not yet known, advocates of
workplace safety and supporters of injured workers should be attentive of
any possible negative impacts on workplace safety, which may take form
in a comparative analysis of how jobsite owners relinquish any control
over workplace safety, any objective worsening of safety measures, and
any documented increase in injuries on multiemployer worksites in the
coming years.

186. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 788 P.2d 545, 550 (Wash. 1990).

